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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the Estate of
WILDA GAIL SWAN, deceased
THEO SWAN HENDEE,
Plaintiff a(fl;d Respondent,

-vs.WALKER BANK & TRUST COMP ANY, Executor of the Last Will
and Testament of WILDA GAIL
SWAN, deceased; GRANT MACFARLANE; DANIEL KOSTOPULOS; and ADA BRIDGE,

Case No. 8216

Defendants and .Ap,pellants.

REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The plain tiff and respondent will be referred to as
contestant or in her own name, and defendants and appellants will be referred to collectively as proponents
or individually in their own names.
All italics are ours.
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ST'ATEMENT. OF· CASE
It shall not be our purpose in this brief to make a
critical analysis of the statement of facts in the Brief of
Respondent. We have endeavored to state the facts objectively and fairly in the Brief of Ap·pellants. Where
the briefs are at variance the record will unquestionably
reveal who is in error. There are several so-called facts
related in respondent's brief, however, to which we feel
obliged to refer.
At page 11 of respondent's brief in connection with
preparation of the will and codicils appears the following: "She relied, and he knew she relied, solely upon
his advice. (R. 205, 211, 206)" This statement contains
the inference that Macfarlane advised and counseled
Gail as to how she should devide her property in her
will. The record does. not substantiate this as a fact,
either directly or by inference. The fact is that Gail
had her own ideas as to how she should devise her property and that she informed Macfarlane of those ideas
on the occasions prior to execution of her will and codicils. He did not attempt to influence he·r or direct her
thinking in any way, shape or form. He has so testified
and there is no evidence to the contrary.
At page 19 of respondent's brief the following statement appears: "Kostopulos disliked the sup·ervision of
Gail by the trained nurse, 1\tlrs. Floulden. Accordingly,
he took Macfarlane to the office of Dr. Frank and there
persuaded Dr. Frank that it would be in the best interest
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of Gail's health if l\frs. Foulden should be discharged.
(R. 454) " The fact is conceded by DT. Frank that discharging Mrs. Foulden was Gail's own idea. The evidence
reveals that Mrs. F'Oulden had insinuated that Gail had
stolen some theatre tickets from her purse·. This so
upset Gail that she initiated the proceedings which resulted in Mrs. Foulden being discharged. To suggest
that this was a devious scheme on the part of Kostopulos
is entirely unwarranted by the testimony (R. 438, 450453, 532, 533).
At page 14 of respondent's brief the following appears: "Betvveen the time when the savings accounts
were thus adjusted and Gail's death, the accounts not
in the name of Macfarlane or Kostopulos were substantially exhausted while the accounts in the name of Macfarlane and Kostopulos remained substantially unimpaired. (R.. 232, 233)" The foregoing is a true statement, but rather than reveal any kind of abuse of confidence on the part of Macfarlane or Kostopulos, it
reveals the absence of such abuse. Neither Macfarlane
nor Kostopulos withdrew nor procured the withdrawal
of one penny from these accounts for their own benefit.
Gail had possession of the bank books. Macfarlane and
Kostopulos at no time interfered with Gail's free use
of the accounts for any purpose she desired. As pointed
out in the brief of appellants the bank accounts affirmatively show that Gail considered Macfarlane and Kosto-
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pulos to be the natural objects of her bounty and genuinely desired to reme1nber them substantially in her
will.
At page 15 appears the following: "He then arranged
to have Kostopulos call at Gail's home and bring her
to Dr. Nielson's office where Macfarlane was waiting
with the will. (R. 331)" There is no ·evidence that Macfarlane made any arrangements whatsoever with Kostapulos in connection with execution of the 'vill. The record
citation of counsel simply doesn't support their claim.
Again at page 14 of respondent's brief the following
appears: "Macfarlane also participated in the· granting
of a long-term lease by Gail to Dan Kostopulos covering
a valuable piece of real estate on South State Street in
·salt Lake City. (R. 250)" If Kostopulos was occupying
the property rent free or was leasing it for some unbusinessl1ke sum, that would be one thing. But there
is no evidence whatsoever that this lease was not a good
and substantial business proposition as far as Gail was
concerned. The p·roperty was income· producing property.
The only way to derive income from it was by leasing
it. The lease, like so many other of Gail's transactions,
is important evidence only because it affirmatively demonstrates Gail's mental competence to conduct her affairs in a businesslike manner.
Also appearin_g at page 15 of respondent's brief is
the following: "Dr. Nielson made a physical examination. (R..383) He then called in Dr. Roy A. Darke, .a
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psychiatrist, and the two of them examined Gail S.wan
and then signed the second codicil as attesting witnesses.
(R. 838)" Respondent persists. with the misimpression
that Dr. Nielsen called Dr. Darke for the first time after
he had examined Gail. This is not true·. I-Ie had made
arrangements for Dr. Darke before- he had ever seen
Gail (R. 804).
At page 16 of respondent's brief is the following:
"It is significant to note that at the time
Macfarlane prepared the first codicil, by which
he would be e-nriched by more than $100,000.00, he
was a defendant in a case pending in the Third
Judicial District Court in which he was accused
of preparing the Last Will and Testament of one
Becker, whereby he became a principal beneficiary. In that proceeding he was accused of abusing his confidential relationship and procuring
Becker's will by fraud and undue influence. (R.
221)"
The foregoing constitutes only a half statement.
Respondent should have gone on in all fairness and informed the Court that the foregoing case was dismissed
and that the contest was d:r4opped he-cause of an 'utter
lack of merit (R. 221). Furthermore, the foregoing evidence could have no possible bearing on the issue of
Gail Swan's testamentary capacity or whether she was.
under the blanket of Macfarlane's undue influence for
a period of five years. It was injected into the case
solely for the purpose of creating an emotional bias and
prejudice which would blind the trier of the fact to the
law and to the evidence of this case.
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At page 19 appears the following: "Kostopulos
also told Butler after Gail's death that Macfarlane had
n1ade a 1nistake when he eliminated Mr. Beam from the
will. (R. 359)" A reading of the record citation which
refers us to Butler's testimony reveals that Butler initiated the conversation by asking Kostopulos questions
about the will and about Beam. Kostopulos answered
that he knew nothing about it, that Macfarlane had prepared the will. This is a far cry from the stretched and
t\visted claim made by counsel.
ARGUMENT
The first statement in contestant's argument is as
follows (p. 24) :
"\Vith respect to Gail's testamentary capacity we
are willing to here repeat the statement we made in our
memorandum to the trial court, that the proof of lack
of testamentary capacity in the record is less compelling
than that of undue influence."
Respondent's brief contains no relation of facts and
no argument to support the trial court's finding that
Gail lacked mental capacity to know who were the natural
objects of her bounty; know her property and dispose
of it understandingly according to a plan. We can only
assume, therefore, that contestant has conceded that the
authorities cited in the Brief of Appellants and the
facts therein related satisfactorily establish that the
trial court was completely carried away by the rising
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well of emotionalism created by counsel for contestant
\vhen he held that Gail lacked testamentary capacity over
the span of Inore than five years from execution of the
will to her death.
The first case cited by contestant on the issue of
undue influence is In re Hamson's Estate, 87 Utah 580,
52 P. 2d 1103. A comparison of the facts of the case at
bar with those in the Hanson case reveals many distinctions. Here we have a woman fully capable of conducting her business affairs, who appeared normal and
competent to the witnesses to the will and codicils on the
three occasions of execution, who mingled freely with
friends and relatives alike during the five years that the
\vill and codicils were in existence. She was actually
examined by a medical doctor and a psychiatrist prior
to execution of the second codicil, who found her to be
competent, and who gave professional opinions that she
acted voluntarily and desired to dispose of her p,rope:rty
in the manner provided in the codicil. We have a lawyer
who prepared a will and codicils in which he was a beneficiary, but who at all times conducted himself in a gentlemanly, kindly manner, who was admired, and respected
by Gail, and for whom Gail had an abiding affection and
a great deal of sympathy over a period of many years.
Here we have a man against whom not one word of
testimony was introduced which show·ed that he ever
forced, encouraged or induced Gail to peTform a single
act against her will, and against whom not one word
of testimony was introduced to show he ever deceived
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Gail, misrep~rese·nted facts to her, or endeavored to alienate h·er family from her. On the contrary, he 'vas close
to and friendly with every member of her family. Kostopulos was a friend of many years standing. He had
helped Gail's father, and attended and assisted him in
many ways bef.ore Mr. Swan's death. He aided and assisted Gail in countless ways over the years. He was. known
to everyone as her "very best friend.'' Theo not only
approved but appreciated the services. rendered by Macfarlane and Kostopulos to Gail. It is difficult to conceive
how Gail, _alone and friendless, would have fared during
h·er declining years without the assistance of these two
men.
· In the H aJ.nson case the evidence showed that Dr.
1\fcDonald secretly took Marie Hanson out and kept her
until late hours; that he never associated with her publicly; that he falsely informed her that her brother-inlaw was mismanaging her affairs; that he burglarized
the brother-in-law's safe and stole books showing decedent's accounts and holdings, and that he prepared the
will, spirited her to his apartment, furnished witnesses
of his o'vn choice, and had the will secretly executed.
Even so, the Court expressed considerable doubt as to
the sufficiency of evidence to support the trial court's
finding of undue influenee. What a vast difference from
the case at bar where a medical doctor and a psychiatrist
of high repute and who had no personal interest in the
transaction, examined the testator and then unhesitatingly witnessed the codicil.
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Respondent has attacked that portion of appellants'
brief that considers presumptions and burdens of proof
and states at page 28: "Some presumptions may disappear as soon as evidence of the facts is introduced,
but many do not so disappear but persist to the vetry
end." Respondent then proce·eds to argue that the presumption of undue influence that arose in the case at
bar did not disappear, but persisted to the very end.
Respondent makes this contention in the very teeth
of In re Bryarn.'s Estate, 82 Utah 390, 25 P. 2d 602, 609.
In the Bryan case this court recognized and gave full
credence to the presumption of undue influence that
arose upon the showing of a confidential relationship,
procuring a will, and heirship. This Court discussed
the· role of the presumption, the evidence necessary to
dissipate the presumption, the burden of proof on the
issue of undue influence, and the sufficiency of evidence
to establish existence of undue influence. In re Bryan's

Estat.e, supra, has never been overruled. The court
in that case stated :
"This court is committed to the doctrine that,
when facts and circumst(}Jnces are shown concerning which a presum.ption arises or is indulged,
the p~esumpt.ion ceases, and the case is to be
decided on the evidence introduced independently
of the presumption; that is, that the presumption
is not evidence and has no weight as evidence.
In re Newell's Estate, 7.8 Utah 4·63, 5 P. 2d 230
and Stat,e v. Green, 78 Utah 463, 6 P. 2d 177."
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The "facts and circumstances" concerning preparation and execution of Gail's will and codicils we-re clearly
shown by the evidence. On May 2, 1947 Gail came to
Macfarlane's office and told him that she wanted to
make a new will. She explained to him in detail how she
wanted her prop·erty devised and to whom. She gave
logical and reasonable reasons for her plan of devise
(R. 202-205, 714-717). Thereafter, she returned to Macfarlane's office and he asked his secretary to find his
office as,sociate to act as the other witness to the will.
Unable to find the office associate, his secretary went
down the hall and found a young lady by the: name of
Vivian W eggeland. Vivian W eggeland was in no way
associated or connected with Grant Macfarlane. The
will was then executed and witnessed in the normal and
customary manner.
In February of 1950 Gail again came to Macfarlane's
office and stated that she wanted to revise her will,
giving as one of the reasons the death of Jack Florsherg.
She advised Macfarlane as to the manner in which she
wanted the will changed and gave him logical and reasonable reasons for the changes which she desired to
make (R. 206, 207, 718-720). She left the office and
returned later, at which time the first codicil was executed and witnessed in the normal and customary manner. The said codicil was execute·d in the presence of
Macfarlane's secretary and an office associate, attorney
Irwin Clawson. Clawson had known Gail for a number
of years (R. 834).
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Shortly before April 23, 1951, Gail again came to
lVIacfarlane's office and again stated that she wanted
her will changed. Again she advised Macfarlane a.s to
the manner in which she wanted the changes made and
gave logical reasons for the changes that she desired to
make. We have previously pointed out that on this
occasion the changes resulted in Macfarlane's interHst in
the will being reduced in the amount of $24,500.00 (R.
727-729). She advised Macfar lan·e that she desired to
have an independent doctor examine her before the will
was executed. Macfarlane suggested Dr. Adolph Nielsen,
City Physician, and made an appointment for Gail to
be examined by Dr. Nielsen. Dr. Nielsen on his own
initiative and before he had ever seen or met Gail, made
preliminary arrangements with Dr. Roy Darke, who
also performed a psychiatric examination of Gail.
On April 23, 1951 Macfarlane met Gail a.t Dr. Nielsen's office. Gail was examined by Dr. Nielsen and given
a careful psychiatric examination by Dr. Roy A. D·arke.
The two doctors agreed completely and without rese-rvation that she was competent, that. she was at ease men-tally, that she was executing the will from her own
desire and not from force or influence of anyone. On
that very day, shortly prior to her visit to Dr. NielS'en 's
office, she had been to Dr. F·rank's office alone and his
records indicated that 'She was ''feeling fine". (Exhibit
19).
The will was executed in the normal manner and
witnessed by Drs. Nielsen and Darke.
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In view of the foregoing facts, it is clear that the
"facts and circumstances" were fully shown, and consequently that the presumption of undue influence ceased
to exist.
The role of the presumption is particularly important in this case for the reason that if a finding of
undue influence can he based upon confidence, preparation of a will and heirship this will must necessarily fail.
But if evidence of the fact's and surrounding circumstances pertaining to preparation and ·execution of the
will dispel the presumption and make proof of undue
influence necessary to a successful contest, then the will
here must be sustained.
At this point we call particular attention to the
language of In re Bryan's Estate, wh.ere it is said:

" * * * Undue influence must be proved. It
will. not be p·r,esumed from 1nere interest or opportumity. ''
" * * * The mere existence of undue influence
or an opportunity to exe-rcise it, i s not sufficient;
such influence must be actually exerted on the
mind of the testator in regard to the execution of
the will in question ... "
1

See also In re Lavelle's Estate, 248 P. 2d 372.
Counsel has summarized the so-called evidence of
undue influence in the Brief of Respon·dent at page 55:
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"They end their argument upon page 126
of their brief, with the statement printed in italics
that there is not a whisper in the record that Gail
was ever induced to do anything against her will.
That statement entirely ignore~s the basic fact
that Gail was a childish and simpleminded woman; that she vvas in confidential relationships with
both appellants, she reposing her confidence and
they accepting it; that Macfarlane was GaiPs attorney at law, and her attorney in fact and confidential friend, and as such, prepared and supervised the execution of the will and codicils ; that
appellants would be unduly enriches by the will
and the codicils and that Gail had no independent
advice in connection with the signing of any of
the testamentary documents."
The foregoing quotation from respondent's brief
reveals the startling truth that contestant's counsel don't
even contend they have ·shown more than "mere interest
or opportunity". For what else does their summary
contain~

It would not be amiss to consider the practical effect
of the rule of law claimed for by counsel. A confidant
who is either a close relative, doctor, religious adviser
or lawyer is reque~sted by a relative, patient, penitent,
or client to help with preparation or procurement of a
will and in that will is made a beneficiary. Such a will
vvould fail by operation of law and the beneficiary stamped !a fraud and a cheat regardless of the fact he made
a full explanation and regardless of the fact that no
evidence, other than of "mere interest or opportunity"
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were introduced. ·such is not and never has been the
law of this juri~sdiction. The presumption and nec-essity
of explanation arises to protect the natural heirs from
losing valuable rights through fraud and undue influence. The presumption disappears when explanatory
evidence is introduced to protect an innocent confidant
from losing a dev:i!se and being stamped a fraud and
cheat without evidence. A claim that a person has exerted
fraud and undue influence on another has always been
a serious matter, and courts have always required evidence to support a finding of fraud and undue influence.
In will case's in this state under the circumstances of
this case where an explanation is made the presumption
has served its protective purpose. From that point on
inference and innuendo cannot and will not support a
finding of fraud. Or to p·ut it in the language, again,
of In re Bryan's Estat.e, supra, a showing of "mere interest or op·p·ortunity" is not enough.
As far as their contention concerning lack of inindependent advice is concerned, we refer the court to
our discussion of that subject in the brief of appellant.
The fact that Gail mingled freely with friends and relatives alike for five years from ex·ecution of the will to
her death, together with all of the other circumstances,
reduces the claimed lack of indep·endent advice to just
another instance of the broodings and suspicions that
form such a major portion of contestant''s case.
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In this connection it is also interesting to note that
Gail's detern1ination not to leave her entire est•ate to
Theo dated back to a time long before she had met Macfarlane, and before she was anything more than a casual
acquaintance of Kostopulos. It will be recalled that she
met Macfarlane in September of 1944 (R. 187). Mortensen testified that on rnany occasions between 1935 when
he first started preparing Gail's income tax and 1944
Gail had inforrned him that Theo had social position, was
amply provided for, and that "she did not intend to leave
1nuch of her property" to Theo (R. 470,487, 488).
Let us consider the authorities cited by counsel for
contestant in support of their remarkable contention
concerning the presumption of undue influence and the
burden of proof.
The first case they cite i's In re Pilcher's Estate,
Von Pilcher v. Pilcher, 114 Utah 72, 197 P. 2d 143. The
facts of that case are set out in some detail at page 29
of the Brief of Respondent.
Certain obiter dictum in Mr. Justice Wade's concurring opinion is to the effect that in order to overcome
the presumption of validity of a marriage a litigant must
present clear and convincing evidence as to its invalidity.
The opinion of the court was actually that the first wife,
attempting to prevent the second wife from administering the estate on the ground of illegality of the seeond
\vife's marriage, was estopped because her objection was
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out of time. Neither the opinion of Justice Pratt nor
the concurring opinion of Justice Wade in any way attempts to limit, alter or influence the effect of In re
Bryan's Estat.e, supra, or the law as applied to the presumption of undue influence arising out of a confidential relationship, preparation of a will and heirship, in a
will case. On the contrary, Mr. Justice Wade cites with
approval In re Newell's Estate, 78 Utah 46-3, 5 P. 2d 230,
1n his discussion of the role of presumptions in Utah.
The next eas-e cited by counsel i(s Meacham v. Allen,
262 P. 2d 285. This case involved the· pTesumption that
a deceased person was in the exercise of ordinary care
for his own safety. Thi's was a head-on collision. The
question concerned whether the defendant or the deceased
was driving on the wrong side of the road!. at thei time
of the collision. Defendants appe-aled from judgment on
a ve-rdict awarding damages to the plaintiffs and claimed
that the court erred in instructing the jury as to the
presumption that deceased used due care. The court
held that it was error to instruc:t on the presumption
inasm.uch ,as evidence had b.een intr01duced conc-erning
the question of whrich of the p,arties w·as on the wrong
side of t!h~e ro~ad. This opinion sustains our contention
that when evidence is introduced concerning a presumption of fact the p·resumption disap:pears and the question
of fact is to be determined exactly as though 1said presumption had not existed. We quote from the opinion:

'' * * * but in this kind of a p·resumption upon
the making of such showing, the presumption dis-
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appears from and beco1nes wholly inoperative in
the case, and the trial from then on should proceed exactly the same as though no presumption
ever existed, or had any effect on the case."
The next case cited by contestant is Peterson v.
Buclge) 35 Utah 596, 102 P. 211. It appeared that Budge,
the defendant, \Vas a doctor and accepted a deed to real
estate from Peterson, his patient. Peterson sued to s-et
aside the deed upon the ground that Budge took advantage of a confidential relationship and obtained the deed
through fraud, 1ni·srepresentation, and undue influence.
Budge denied the plaintiff's allegations. The trial court
found for Budge and dismissed the case. The Supreme
Court reversed and ordered findings in behalf of Peterson, the plaintiff. There are obvious distinctions between
the cases.
The rule of law for which the Peterson case stands
is that where a confidential relationship ·exists betwteen
contracting parties who are also parties litigant, the
burden of proof is cast upon the superior party to establish first, that he furnished the inferior party full information, and second, that the transaction was equitable
and the consideration adequate. The court not only
found that the confidential relationship existed, but
found that a full revelation of the facts was not furnished
by the superior party and also that the superior party
gained an unconscionable advantage by payment of inadequate consideration. The case at bar and the Pet.e:rson
case are readily distinguishable. Here no contractual
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relationship existed between the parties litigant or between the maker and the beneficiaries of the will. No
confidential relationship existed between the parties
litigant. F:urthermore, no adverse interest existed bet"\veen the maker and the beneficiaries of the will. Evidence of a confidential relationship in a contract case
hears upon the question of concealment or misrepresentation with resulting advantage gained by the one
contracting party over the other. Whereas, evidence of
a confidential relationship in a will case bears only upon
the question of whether the will of the testator or testatrix had been overpowered. The very purpose of a will
is disp·osal of all of one's property upon the contingency
of death. No consideration running from the beneficiary
to the mal\:er of the will is necessary. The fact that a
beneficiary also occupies a confidential relationship with
the maker does not preclude him as a beneficiary, if such
be the maker's will.
The next case cited by contestant is Omega Inv. Co.
v. Woolley et. al.J 72 Utah 474, 271 Pac. 797. In that case
Woolley, the defendant, procured an important stock
interest in plaintiff corporation fron1 Baldwin, who
owned the controlling interest in the corporation. Woolley had gained Bald\vin's confidence; was his confidential
adviser in whom Baldwin had the utn1ost faith. Woolley
possessed superior knowledge, understanding and infor~1ation concerning the invest1nent company. He did
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ous advantage over Baldwin. Here again was a business
deal in which the superior party to a confidential relationship obtained an unconscionable advantage over an
inferior party.
In the case at bar there \vas no issue of superior
infor1nation, concealment, fraud or misrepresentation.
Gail knew that by her will she was leaving her property
to the parties na1ned upon the contingency of her death.
Contestant can hardly make a clain1 to the contrary. No
contest of conflicting interests was involved whatsoever,
and, as we have pointed out, Gail's determination not to
leave all her estate to Theo had been constant and steadfast for years, dating back to a time long before she had
ever 1net l\Tacfarlane (R·. 470, 487, 488).
The next case cited by contestant is Jard.in.e v. Archibald, decided January 24, 1955, 279 P. 2d 454. That case
involved gifts made by decedent in her lifetime to certain
of her children. The legality of these gifts was attacked
following her death by other of her children. The distinction between the J a.rd'in.e case and the case at bar is
readily discernible. In a gift case there is an immediate
tra.nsfer. The donor has lost the right to use and dispose
of his own property. This fact alone would render any
gift to a confidant immediately most circumspect. In a
will case, the maker of the will has no intention of divesting himself of property, except only upon the contingency
of death. Therefore, his position during his lifetime is
not materially altered or changed.
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The usual, customary and normal thing is for the
various devises to be made to individuals occupying confidential relationships \Vith the maker of a will. It i8
also a frequent and con11non occurrence for such a confidant to participate in preparation or to procure the
preparation of a \vill. The law has always been uniforn1
that such persons are not necessarily precluded fron1
participation in the estate of a deceased person simply
because they occupied a confidential relationship with
deceased and pa.rticipated in preparation of the will.
Th:lr. Justice \Vade states the rule in the Jardine case
as follows:
"It is well settled that where a fiduciary or
confidential relationship exists between the donor
wnd donee, equity raises a presumption against
the validity of such transactions and the burden
is cast upon the donee to prove their validity and
that there was no fraud or undue influence by
proving affirmatively and by clear and convincing
evidence co1nplia.nce with equitable requisites."
This principle by its own terms is confined to gift
cases.
In the J a,rdine case the appellants clain1ed in their
brief, an1ong other things, that a confidential relationship existed bet,veen the donor and the donee and that
the burden therefore rested with the donee to overco1ne
the presumption of undue influence hy clear and convincing proof.
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It was respondent's position that the evidence did
not establish a confidential relationship between the
donor and the donee and that the evidence was sufficient
to support a finding that the gift was freely and voluntarily made.
This court based its op1n1on upon the proposition
that even though a confidential relationship existed,
nevertheless the evidence, \vhen viewed in the light most
favorable to respondent, was adequate to support a finding of lack of undue influence. Therefore, the role of
the presumption did not assume a position of importance
in the case.
The Jardine case makes no effort to alter or modify.
In re Bryan's Estate, or to in any way change the law
of presumptions in a will contest in this state. ·
Counsel also drag in the old case of Viallet v. Consolida,t.ed Ry. & Pow~er Co., 30 Utah 260, 84 P. 496, decided
in February, 1906. That case involved a personal injury
and a release. Defendant's company doctor treated and
cared for plaintiff and fraudulently misrepresented to
plaintiff that his injuries were minor and temporary
when as a matter of fact they were serious and permanent and thereby induced plaintiff to sign a release
of his claim for the sum of $120.00. Defendant's motion
for non-suit was granted and plaintiff appealed. The
court in reversing stated :
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"In each of the two cases last referred to,
the facts were equally within the knowledge of
the plaintiff and defendant, and no relation of
confidence and trust existed between the parties.
In the case before us the jury might well have
found from the evidence, as it now appears in
the record, that respondent's physician knew or
had reason to believe that plaintiff's injuries a.t
the time he signed the release, were much more
serious than he (the doctor) represented them to
be, and that he intentionally concealed from plaintiff his real condition, and that plaintiff, on account of the doctor's superior knowledge, accepted
and acted upon the representations and assurances made by him res~pecting the condition and
probable duration of his (plaintiff's) injuries."
The Viallet ·case doesn't stand for the rule claimed
for it by counsel. Furthermore, it doesn't parallel a will
case either in fact or in principle.
As far as we have been able to determine the Pet~er
son case has been cited by the Utah Supreme Court four
times.
Froyd v. Bar,nhwrst et al., 28 P. 2d 135, involved an
equitable action to set aside a deed.
Olson v. Ga.ddis Inv. Co., 39 P. 2d 744, involved an
action to rescind a contract for purchase of an apartment
house.
Ashton v. Skeen et al., 39 P. 2d 1073, involved an
action to set aside a con tract het,veen attorney and client.
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Glol'er v. Glover, 242 P. 2d 298, involved an action to
set aside a quitclairn deed.

In each of the foregoing cases the action was between
persons claimed to have occupied a confidential relationship with each other and in which one person was seeking
econornic redress for advantages taken over him by a
superior confidant.
As far as we have been able to determine the Omega
Inv. Contpany case has only been cited by the Utah 'Supreme Court three times. Ashton v. Skeen et al., supTa,
cites the case along with the Peterson case. JJ1 ollerup v.
Daynes-Beebe Music Co., 24 P. 2d 306, cites the case on
another matter. Jardvne v. Archibald, supra, also cites
the case. Neither the Peterson case nor the Omega Inv.
Company case has ever been cited by the Utah Supreme
Court in connection with a will contest case "\vhere questions arising out of a confidential relationship and a
elairn of undue influence have been involved, although
such cases have since been before the court many times.
On the other hand In re Bryan's Estate has been cited
four times. In re Goldsberry's Estate, 81 P. 2d 1106,
involving a question of undue influence, cites In Re
Bryan's Esta,te with approval. In re George's Estate, 112
P. 2d 498, also involving a question of undue influence,
cites In re Bry:arn' s Esta.te with approval. Stal.e v. Bru;n.o,
85 P. 2d 795, 800 and Malia v. Seeley 57 P. 2d 357, 360,
cite the case on an evidentiary matter of no interest here.
In re Newell's Estate, supra, is one of the most frequently
cited Utah will contest cases.
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The following cases cite In re N ew·ell' s Estate in
sup.port of the proposition that when evidence concerning
a presumption has been introduced the presumption becomes nonexistent:

Buckley ·v. Francis, 6 P. 2d 188;
Chamberla,in et ,al. v. Larsevn et al., 29 P. 2d 355,
36~2;

Fox v. La~vender) 56 P. 2d 1049;
Pet.erson v. Sorensen, 65 P. 2d12;
Saltas v. Affleck, 102 P. 2d 493;
Buhler v. Mad:dison) 166 P. 2d 205, 208 and 176 P.
2:d 118;
State v. Prettyman, 191 P. 2d 142;

In re Pilcher's Estate, 197 P. 2d 143;
Tut.tle v. Pacific lntermo'U/YI)tain Express Co., 242
P. 2d 764.
Finally counsel calls attention to the ease of Glover
v. Glover, 242 P. 2d 298, as citing with approval the case
of Peterson v. Bu1dge. This case likewise involved an
·entirely different principle of law than that now before
the court. This was an action seeking to modify a prior
divorce decree on the basis of extrinsic fraud. There
was evidence to support a finding that the husband and
wife had entered into oral agreement prior to the divorce by which the wife was to deliver a quitclaim deed
to certain property to her husban·d. He was to sell the
property and divide the proceeds. In reliance upon this
understanding she then obtained a divorce and no men-........
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tion was 1nade of the agreement concerning the property.
The clain1 was 1nade that she was induced not to present
her clain1 to an interest in this property by the extrinsic
fraud of her husband. The judgment of the lower court,
sustaining a general demurrer, was reversed and the
case ren1anded for trial on the basis that this was a
1natter which could properly be considered in the original
divorce action and that it was not necessary to file an
independent and separate action. The court merely cites
Peterson v. Bu,dge on an incidental matter. The Glover
case does not stand for the proposition urged by contestant, either directly or inferentially.
It is clear that the Utah cases cited by conte_stant
and the Utah cases cited by the proponents represent
separate and distinct lines of authorities in separate and
distinct fields of the law. It is likewise clear that the
Peterson, the Omeg·a In.v. Comparn;y and the Jardine
ctlses have no rna teriality here.
Inasmuch as witnesses have testified fully concerning the events before, during, and after execution of the
will and codicils, and have testified fully concerning
whether or not undue influence was exercised at the time
of execution of the will and codicils, the presumption of
fact arising from the confidential relationship· and the
bequest to Macfarlane has spent its force and cannot be
considered as evidence.
Justice would then seem to demand an answer to
the question: Where are the examples of undue influ-
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ence to support the insidious accusations 1nade by counsel~ If contestant is not required to answer this question
to the satisfaction of this court before a finding of undue
influence is sustained, then Macfarlane and Kostopulos
must stand forever branded as frauds and cheats solely
on the basis of the accusations hurled against them.
Counsel for contestant has claimed some items as evi-·
dence of undue influence. At page 57 of the Brief of
Respondent appears the following statement: ~'Kosta
pulos' statement to the \Vitness Butler that l\facfarlane
1nade a mistake vvhen he omitted Oscar Beam from the
codicil is likewise persuasive that the preparation of the
codicil had been the subject of discussion and agreement
between the two." As we have previously pointed out,
the record does not substantiate contestant's clailn. On
the contrary, Butler's testimony shows there was no
"discussion and agree1nent between the two." Contestant failed to point out that this testimony was allowed
in the case against Kostopulos but excluded in the case
against l\1acfarlane a.s being hearsay.
At page 58 of their brief, counsel for contestant
state: "Mrs. Frank testified without contradiction that
Gail tovvard the end of her life frequently stated that
she could not get 'her papers fro1n l\1acfarlane' (R. ·5612-3). Mrs. Frank asked Gail why she did not demand
the1n but l\1acfarlane had replied with this statement:
'Gail, you are a sick girl. You can't have your papers
around the house.' "
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The significance of the foregoing testimony is questionable. It is inconsistent with contestant's own clain1
at page 11 that Gail's confidence and trust in Macfarlane
never ceased throughout her life. Furthermore, the foregoing testimony is not proper evidence. It is hearsay
and the authorities are lmiform that such evidence would
not support a finding that Macfarlane ever held "papers"
a-\vay fro1n Gail. See

WigJnor~e

On Evidence, 3 Ed., S·ec.

1738:
" * * * (1) The testator's 'assertion that
a person', named or unnamed, has procured him
by' fraud' or by 'pressure' to execute a will or to
insert a provision, is plainly obnoxious to the
Hearsay rule, if offered as evidence that the fact
asserted did occur:

1868, COLT J., In Shailer v. Bumstead, 99
Mass. 122: 'When used for such purpose, they
are mere hearsay, which by reason of the death
of the party whose statements are so offered, can
never be explained or contradicted by him. Obtained, it may be, by deception or persuasion, and
always liable to the infirmities of human recollection, their admission for such purpose would go
far to destroy the security which it is essential to
preserve'; "they are thus inadmissible so far as
they form 'a declaration or narrative to show the
fact of fraud or undue influence at a previous
period.'
For this reason such declarations of a testator are by most Courts regarded as inadmissible."
It is interesting to note that counsel for contestant
devote only four pages out of a 97 page brief to the
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authorities cited by appellants 1n their brief. Counsel
brush aside In re New,ell's Estat.e, 78 Utah 463, 5 P (2)
230, with the staten1ent at page 59: "The presumption
discussed in the Newell case was one based upon the
total absence of facts, "\vhile the one now under revie·w
flows from the basic facts in the record." They entirely
ignore the fact that In re Newell's E st:ate is a will contest case, was cited and relied upon by this court In re
Bryan's Estat1e, supra, as well as in many other will cases
.decided by this Court. They attempt to brush aside In
re Bryan's Estate, supra, with the statement that it "did
not contain the basic facts which must control the decision in the case at bar." As we have pointed out the
very issue in re Bryan's Est:ate was the role of the presumption of undue influence in a will contest case where
a confidential relationship existed and where the confidant p:articip·ated in procurring ·and was a beneficiary
in the will.
One of the remarkable aspects of the Brief of Respondent is the fact that no mention is made of In re
Lavelle's Estate, supra. This is of particular interest
inasmuch as In re Lavelle's Estate is unquestionably
closer to the case at bar in fact situation and principle
on the issue of undue influence than any other Utah
case.
In that case, Innnerthal and Hogg both occupied a
confidential relationship· with Mrs. Lavelle. They had
care·d for her and attended to her every need during a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

three year period of invalidism prior to her death. Hogg
lived at her home and the court found that he maintained
an illicit relationship with Mrs. Lavelle. Irnmerthal was
actually guardian of her person for a timH before her
death. A more perfect opportunity and motive for exerting undue influence could hardly be conceived. Mrs.
J_javelle completely disinherited her half-sister and other
relatives in behalf of the two confidants, Immerthal and
Hogg. I--Iowever, the court clearly pronounces the long
standing rule of law that:
"To declare a will invalid because of undue
influence, there must be an exhibition of more
than influence or suggestion, there must be substantial proof of an overpowering of the testator's volition at the time the will was made, to
the extent he is impelled to do that which he
would not have done had he been free from such
controlling influence, so that the will represents
the desire of the person exercising the influence
rather than that of the testator."
And again:

" * * * a finding of undue influence cannot
rest upon mere suspicion."
In the Lavelle case circumstances were proven by
proponents with respect to execution of the will and
the Court held that contestant having failed to "point
out the person who it is alleged exercised the undue influence and his acts constituting the alleged undue in-
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fluence" must fail in the contest. All that contestant
has been able to do \vith In re Lavelle's

Esta,t~e

is ostrich-

like to ignore that case and to point to the Peterson
case involving a confidant procuring a deed by fraud;
the Omega Inv. Co. case involving a confidant procuring
stocks by fraud; and the Jardine case involving a gift
to a fiduciary.
CONCLUSION
Contestant would have this court completely discountenance the overwhelming evidence that Gail successfully 1net all qualifications for testamentary capacity; discountenance the testilnony of the witnesses to
the will and two codicils that no undue influence was
exerted on Gail; discountenance the fact that the will
and codicils were in existence for a period of five years
prior to her death, during which time she mingled freely
vvith her friends and relatives; discountenance the fact,
and we reiterate it, that there is not a whisper of evidence that Gail ever perform.ed so 1nuch as a single act
against her will; and uphold a decision that undue influence had been continually exerted over Gail for a
period of five years; a decision based on evidence which
at n1ost " ... a1nounts to no more than n1ere opportunity,
colored by respondent's hopeful suspicions." See In re
Lav.elle's Estate, supra.
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We respectfully submit that this Honorable Court
should reaffirn1 the Bryan and Lavelle cases and admit
the \Vill and codicils of Wilda Gail s.,van to probate.
Respectfully subn1itted,
RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
WAYNE L. BLACK
Counsel for Defendant and
Appellant, Grant Macfarlane
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
N. J. Cotro-Manes
Counsel for Defendant and
.Appellant, Daniel Kostopulos
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